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1. Macro-prudential policy versus asset price bubbles 
in monetary union member states –  
The case of Spain 
Małgorzata Karaś 
 
The paper considers the ability of macro-prudential instruments – top-down regulations 
applied on the financial system as a whole, aimed at slowing credit growth and decreasing 
systemic risk – to flatten a growing asset price bubble in a country not having independent 
monetary policy. This is problem is analyzed from the perspective of Spain – a eurozone 
member state, for which the common monetary policy turned out to be expansionary, and 
which introduced a macro-prudential tool, dynamic provisioning, in the previous decade. 
The paper analyses the factors that influenced the em rgence of the bubble of the Spanish 
real estate market in the previous decade. It takes into account demand and supply factors, 
as well as discusses the ECB’s monetary policy in the context of Spain. Finally, it provides 
an overview of dynamic provisioning, the Spanish macro-prudential tool. 
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1. Introduction 
Towards the end of the first decade of the XXI century, Spain, just like many coun-
tries around the world went through a severe financial crisis, preceded by a bubble 
on the real estate market and turmoil on the credit market. The nominal interest rates 
on new mortgage loans reached as low levels as 3-4% in the years 2003-5, which 
represented a radical decline from about 15% in early 1990, while the average ma-
turity of mortgage loans in Spain increased from 10 to 28 years between 1990 and 
2007 (Garcia-Herrero–de Lis 2008, Garriga 2010). The property prices multiplied by 
over 2 from the mid-1990s to 2004 and by 3 in the period 1995-2007. These multi-
pliers for the whole euro area altogether are significantly lower: 1.5 and 1.8, respec-
tively – the increase in property prices in Spain was significantly higher than, for 
example, in the United States.1 In fact, the cumulative growth of house prices in 
                                                   
 
1 As Garriga (2010) puts it, the housing boom in Spain makes the boom in the United States appear 
small.  
 Małgorzata Karaś 
 
14
Spain was among the highest in the OECD (Garriga 2010, Salmon 2010). As re-
search shows (Fernandez-Kranz–Hon 2006, Caruana 2005), property prices‘ in-
crease in Spain was far beyond the long-term equilibrium, which makes it fulfil the 
criteria for a bubble (Kim–Suh 1993, Gallin 2003). 
Figure 1. House prices in Spain, the United Kingdom, and the euro area, 1995=1002 
 
Source: ECB, UK National Statistics 
 
Looking at the severance of the bubble in Spain, it seems necessary to pose a 
question: what specific factors on the supply, demand, and policy side might have 
contributed to the situation? 
2. Monetary policy 
The European Monetary Union has always consisted of separate, independent states, 
with a different level of development. According to numerous studies from the late 
90’s. (Flaig–Wollmersgaeuser 2007), mobility of labour in the countries about to 
form the Eurozone was low, real wages – rigid downward, shocks – distributed 
asymmetrically among countries, inflation – varied3, to a level not explainable by 
                                                   
 
2 1995 was chosen as the starting date of the chart because reference to house prices in 1995 is the most 
common in literature. 
3 For those reasons, EMU creation was a controversial concept from the economics’ perspective since 
its beginnings. As argued by many, for example Charles Wyplosz (2006), it was led by the political 
need, rather than well grounded in economic research. The whole process of eurozone creation, traced 
back by Bień (1988) as far back as to the Treaty of Rome signed i  1957, rested on Germany’s 
willingness to give up the Deutsche Mark (Wyplosz 2006) and, consequently, was strongly influenced 
by particular political interests at each stage (Bień 1998). On one hand, it can be argued that that the 
optimal currency area theory was not entirely operation l at the time of eurozone creation, and varied 
creation criteria were favoured by different researche s (e.g. mobility of capital and labour emphasized 
by Mundell (1961), strong trade within OCA favoured by McKinnon (1963), diversification of the 
region’s economy emphasized by Kenen (1969). However, as argued by Wyplosz (2006), economic 
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the Balassa-Samuelson effect.4 These reasons posed significant risks to the introduc-
tion of a single monetary policy regime: as suggested by Balcerowicz (2012) it 
could turn out to be inadequate to a country’s fundamentals, either periodically 
(“temporal aspect“, important for countries with business cycles imperfectly syn-
chronized with the “average“ business cycle of the euro zone to which the European 
Central Bank’s rate correspond5) or structurally (“structural aspect“, in countries 
with a different natural interest rate level6). There is broad empirical research which 
focuses on differences between the ECB’s monetary policy and optimal monetary 
policy from the perspective of respective countries. 
One of econometric analyses of inadequacy of the European Central Bank’s 
monetary policy to the needs of euro zone countries is presented in a paper by Flaig 
and Wollmersgaeuser (2007). As a measure of divergence tendencies in the euro 
zone they used the stress (Clarida et al. 1998) – difference between the Eurozone’s 
short-term interest rate and the interest rate that would be adopted by each country if 
it followed the “optimal monetary policy“, approximated by its central bank’s policy 
in the pre-euro era. They found that in the case of Germany the stress indicator re-
mained close to zero during the whole period (which implies that the ECB continued 
the policy of the German Bundesbank for the whole euro area7). At the same time, 
for most euro zone countries interest rates were too low in the period of 1999-2005 
by 1-2 percentage points. The ECB monetary policy was especially expansionary for 
Greece, Spain, Italy, France, and Ireland before 2003 (Figure 2). 
                                                                                                
 
logic was clearly given lower priority than political reasons in this process, as the basic criteria of OCA 
creation that most researches agree upon, such as strong mobility of production factors and same 
inflation and output growth rates (Bień 1998, p. 164.), were not fulfilled.   
4 Significant differences in inflation among EU countries could only partially be explained by the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect (Balassa 1964, Samuelson 1964), that is the process of real convergence of 
lower income countries within the currency area (signif cant productivity growth in the tradable sector 
of these countries translating into higher real wages in both tradable and non-tradable sectors and 
consequent higher inflation). Recent empirical evidence suggests that the Balassa-Samuelson effect 
does not suffice as an explanation of persistent inflation in the EMU (Rogers 2007). 
5 There was no wide consensus regarding whether national business cycles would become more 
synchronized after the union creation (intensification of international trade could synchronize economic 
activities, so optimality of a currency area could emerge after a monetary union launch in countries that 
did not form one ex ante; Frankel–Rose 1998) or less synchronized due to higher specialization in the 
union and impact of sector specific shocks (Krugman 1993). 
6 Wicksell’s (1936) concept of an interest rate compatible with output being at its potential and 
stationary growth. 
7 It is worth to note that this fact can be partly justified by Germany’s contribution to the euro area’s 
economy: Germany’s GDP has ranged between 28% and 33% of euro area’s GDP (calculations based 
on Eurostat’s data). 
 Małgorzata Karaś 
 
16
Figure 2. Country-specific stress for Eurozone member countries, 1999-2005 
 
Source: Flaig and Wollmersgaeuser (2007) 
 
A similar analysis devoted exclusively to Spain was performed by Arghyrou 
and Gadea (2008, Figure 3). They modelled Spanish monetary policy before the eu-
ro-accession (1980-1998), then forecasted the interest rates which the Bank of Spain 
would have set after 1999 if it had been independent, and finally used the differ-
ences between the forecast and actual ECB rates as a measure of compatibility be-
tween the single monetary policy regime and fundamentals of the Spanish economy. 
They found that after 1999 the Bank of Spain would have set nominal interest rates 
twice as high as those set by the European Central Bank. 
Arghyrou (2008) published a similar analysis devoted o Greece and found 
that the ECB’s monetary policy also seemed too loose (and “incompatible with the 
Greek economic conditions”). Hayo and Hofmann’s (2006) research suggests that 
German interest rates would have been similar to those of the ECB under a hypo-
thetical Bundesbank regime after 1999. 
Similar conclusions to those mentioned above can be drawn from a compari-
son of the ECB monetary policy with the level of interest rates suggested for each 
euro-zone country by the Taylor rule. Caruana (2005) analysed the period of 2004-
2005 and found that the ECB’s monetary policy was then expansionary for Spain 
and Greece (Figure 4). 
 
Macro-prudential policy versus asset price bubbles in monetary union member states 
 
17 
Figure 3. Comparison between nominal interest rate set by the ECB and three 





Note: If it had remained autonomous and continued its policy from the period 1980-
1998. Two variants: panel (a) not taking into account credibility gains caused by 
euro zone accession (b) with those included in the model 
Source: Arghyrou and Gadea (2008) 
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Figure 4. Deviations of interest rates in the Eurozone from the Taylor rule in 2004-
2005. Weights of 1.5 (inflation's deviation from target) and 0.5 (output gap), natural 
interest rate of 2%, inflation target of 2%, inflation index excluding energy and 
unprocessed foods 
 
Source: Caruana (2005) 
 
Clearly, therefore, Spain seems to be an example of inc mpatibility between 
the single monetary policy regime and a country’s macroeconomic fundamentals: 
from Spain’s perspective, the ECB’s monetary policy was expansionary. As argued 
in Karaś (2013) and demonstrated by a number of empirical analyses (e.g. 
Jarociński–Smets 2008, Taylor 2010, Ahrend et al. 2008), loose monetary policy can 
contribute to the emergence of an asset price bubble, for example a bubble on a real 
estate market. 
3. Demand factors on the Spanish property market 
The factors that drove the demand on the Spanish real estate market in the previous 
decade can be broadly classified according to two dimensions: the first division sep-
arates fundamental demand factors from those related to the ease of financing hous-
ing, while the second one separates policy from non-policy factors. 
Purely demand, non-policy factors include demography, immigration, and 
culture. Spain is a high owner-occupation, low private rental country: only about 
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13% houses in Spain are privately rented8 (Maclennan 2000). It experienced a giant 
inflow of immigrants in the last decade: the significant increase in population (over 
15% of growth between 2000 and 2011) was largely due to immigration. The net 
migration in Spain in the period 2002-2007 amounted to 87-102% of total popula-
tion growth each year, with Eastern Europe, Latin America and North Africa being 
the most important contributors (Garriga 2010). The s are of the foreign-born popu-
lation in Spain was as of 2011 as high as 14%. The significant growth in population 
certainly increased demand on the property market, but also affected the supply side 
(see later). 





It is worth noting that the inflow of immigrants toSpain was not only driven 
by the general economic growth of this country, which made it attractive for job-
seekers from abroad. An important factor was also the growth of popularity of holi-
day houses – due to the Mediterranean climate – especially among foreigners, such 
as retired citizens of the UK and Northern Europe. It can be argued that this way – 
due to the less favourable climate of the United Kingdom – this country contributed 
to the Spanish real estate boom (Muellbauer 2007). Holiday homes were also popu-
lar among Spanish citizens, simultaneously because of the atmosphere of prosperity 
in Spain (Garriga 2010) and a wish to compensate for high density apartment living 
in cities (Salmon 2010). 
 
                                                   
 
8 According to Maclennan et al. (2000), those countries owe it to their social democratic heritage. 
 Małgorzata Karaś 
 
20




Two more issues related to demography are worth noting. Firstly, Spain – un-
like many other countries, e.g. Britain – experienced a baby boom in the 70’s. (Fig-
ure 7, Caruana 2005, Garcia-Herrero–de Lis 2008), and that generation grew up and 
started to move out of their parents‘ homes in the last decade. Secondly, Spanish 
families’ are known for their traditional preference for home ownership (Caruana 
2005). 
Based on the analysis above it seems that pure demand factors driving the 
boom, such as demography and immigration, were relativ y strong in Spain. 
The second group of factors, purely demand policy-related factors, include 
fiscal policy related to housing. Intuitively, countries where tax treatment favours 
owner-occupied housing over tenant-occupied (for example tax credits from which, 
naturally, only house owners can benefit) seem to have a larger proportion of citi-
zens in owner-occupied housing (Garriga 2010).9 An example if such a country 
                                                   
 
9 Such policy’s fairness is disputable, as renters usually are the young and poor households. This is why 
Beynet et al. (2011) suggest replacing subsidizing ownership with targeted cash-transfers as a housing 
support for low-income households, especially that en demographic characteristics of the household 
could be taken into account. 
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clearly is Spain, which offered its inhabitants taxcredits available for 15% of amor-
tization and interest payments on mortgage debt, suject to an annual maximum. By 
strengthening the incentives of owning property, such a policy seems to have con-
tributed to the boom on the Spanish market: a model by Lopez-Garcia (2004) pre-
dicts home prices lower by between 11% and 21%10 had housing subsidies, implicit 
in the personal income tax, eliminated. 
The increased popularity of owning real estate among households would not 
have created the boom without an adequate response from the banking sector. This 
is why the next issues driving the boom on the realestate market relate to the easy 
access to financing which Spanish society enjoyed in the previous decade. 




The first group are policy-related factors related to the ease of receiving cred-
it. The first factor here is the low central banks‘ interest rate, which has already been 
mentioned previously. The EMU accession increased th  credibility of Spain and 
other peripheral economies, brought a consequent fall in the country risk premia 
(spreads between government bond yields of euro area countries narrowed to very 
low levels; Bini Smaghi 2011) and a sharp decline of real interest rates, which re-
mained below 0 most of the time between 1999 and 2007 (Figures 8 and 9). 
                                                   
 
10 Those numbers come from the version of the model with exogenous land prices. If land prices had 
also been estimated by the model, the difference would have been higher. 
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Figure 8. Policy rates set by the ECB in the period 1999-2012 
 
Source: Eurostat 




The general confidence in the future deepening of the EU single market, as 
well as in structural reforms to be adopted in peripheral countries, brought the ex-
pectation that their competitiveness and GDP growth should increase. This belief 
was shared by the financial markets, companies, and households. Financial markets 
were eager to lend to corporates and companies were eag r to borrow, both groups 
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expecting high ROI. Households were interested in both increased consumption and 
housing loans, aiming for an increase in their living standards and believing in the 
appreciation of houses in the future (McQuinn–O’Reilly 2007). Those mechanisms 
led to a general boom in the Spanish economy. At the same time, the increased cred-
ibility of Spain and low short-term interest rates made it easy for banks to obtain fi-
nancing on wholesale money markets. 




Another factor are the developments of the market of credit instruments them-
selves. In Spain, no significant number of subprime loans was advanced (Salmon, 
2010), and securitization was relatively limited there. The main reason for that was 
the conservative regulation of banks – ever since 2004, asset-backed securities trans-
ferred to SPV de facto still remained on their owners‘ balance sheets as only the 
consolidated balance sheets were assessed by supervi ors. However, the vast majori-
ty (over 80%) of Spanish homeowners used adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) to 
finance the purchase of a house11, which made it easier to transfer the interest rate
risk on customers (Figure 11). 
                                                   
 
11 98% according to Garcia-Herrero and de Lis (2008). 
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Figure 11. Mortgage product interest variability 
 
Source: Lea (2010) 
 
A factor affecting the boom which differentiates Spain from a number of dif-
ferent countries is the fact, that – having noticed the lending boom – the Bank of 
Spain introduced in 2000 the dynamic provisioning system which in practice penal-
ized credit growth and could today be called a macro-prudential tool. It was adopted 
despite strong criticism from the Spanish banks whodescribed it as worsening their 
position against foreign competitors (Garcia-Herrero–de Lis 2008). The two objec-
tives of dynamic provisions were (Fernandez de Lis–Garcia-Herrero 2010): 
- to slow down the credit growth by increasing the cost (in terms of provision-
ing effort) of granting new loans; 
- to protect Spanish banks from future losses which are a natural consequence 
of the relaxation of lending standards during a boom. 
 
The provisioning system after 2000 was to be based on three types of provi-
sions: specific and generic (both existed before) and statistical (the new component). 
The first kind depended on current bad loans, the second was equal to 1% of the 
credit stock, and the third depended on credit growth and was designed to offset 
specific provisions (pro-cyclical since there are few non-performing loans during a 
boom; Fernandez de Lis–Garcia-Herrero 2010). 
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In the new provisioning system, bank assets were classified according to risk 
categories and assigned parameters, with a standard (with parameters ranking from 
0% for public sector debt to 1.5% for credit card lending and current account over-
drafts) or internally-developed method (subject to supervisory evaluation). Statisti-
cal provisions were then charged on a quarterly basis. They could be either positive 
or negative, depending on credit growth (with a positive coefficient) and contempo-
rary bad loans (with a negative coefficient). Accumulated statistical provisions gen-
erated a fund, with an upper limit of 3 times the ad quate coefficient times the expo-
sure (Garcia-Herrero–de Lis 2008). 
What is interesting to note is that the dynamic provisi ning system was 
changed in 2004 – for a couple of reasons. The first one was the criticism from 
standard-setters of international accounting rules. They argued statistic provision 
was against the “fair value” principles of International Financial Reporting Stand-
ards and allowed profit smoothing along the cycle, masking the real situation of the 
banks. The second one was the significant increase of the sum of statistical provi-
sions as the boom continued. Total provisions reachd 2.5% of credit (with specific 
provisions reaching only 0.5% of credit), and the coverage of provisions over bad 
debt reached nearly 500% (Fernandez de Lis–Garcia-Herrero 2010). Those numbers 
were widely considered as too high, especially by the banks which again argued that 
the statistical provisions posed a disadvantage against competitors from abroad 
(Garcia-Herrero–de Lis 2008, Fernandez de Lis–Garcia-Herrero 2010). 
The Bank of Spain responded to these arguments by merging statistic provi-
sions with the generic provisions. The new generic p ovisions were counted using 
the following formula: 
 
generic provision = α ∆ credit + β credit – specific provision 
 
where α and β values are presented in the Table 2. The upper limit of the Fund 
of the new generic provisions was reduced to between 0.33 and 1.25 times α times 
the exposure (Garcia-Herrero–de Lis 2008). 
After the reform (especially as a consequence of the change of the upper limit 
of provisions) the ratio of provisions to credit decr ased, from 2.5% in 2004 to 2.2% 
in 2007. 
It is interesting to note that after the introduction of dynamic provisioning in 
2000 the growth of credit stabilized around 15%, and then slightly decreased, which 
might have been – at least to a certain extent – due to both the provisions and the 
burst of the dot-com bubble. However, after 2004 – which coincided with the 
change in the provisioning system – credit accelerated sharply and reached rates of 
growth above 25% in 2006 (Figure 12). 
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Table 2. Coefficients applied to dynamic provisioning after the reform in 2004  
Type of risk α β 
No apparent risk 0% 0% 
Low risk 0.6% 0.11% 
Low-medium risk 1.5% 0.44% 
Medium risk 1.8% 0.65% 
Medium-high risk 2% 1.1% 
High risk 2.5% 1.64% 
Source: Fernandez de Lis–Garcia-Herrero (2010) 
Figure 12. GDP growth (in light grey) and credit growth (in dark grey) in Spain, 
1991-2009 
Source: Fernandez de Lis and Garcia-Herrero (2010) 
4. Supply’s reaction on the Spanish property market 
A couple of factors which drove the supply side of the real estate market in Spain 
should be noted. 
The first one was the liberalization of constructible land in 1998 and 2003, 
which resulted in a 28% increase in the availability of land for construction (Garriga 
2010). As before, land which was not zoned for housing could be bought at a fairly 
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low price. After the liberalization, this land could be easily transformed into con-
structible land via an administrative process. Already filing the application for the 
transformation pushed the land prices forward, let alone successful application. This 
is why it became popular to buy land, apply, and resell it at a substantial profit or 
develop real estate. This legal opportunity drove land prices12, and generated profits 
for land owners, local authorities13, and corrupted individuals involved in the ap-
proval process (Salmon 2010). 
The second was the big reservoir of relatively low-cost labour, being both the 
unemployed (as the level of unemployment in Spain never fell below 8% of the ac-
tive population; Salmon 2010) and the immigrants, that could be employed by this 
sector (Garriga 2010). As a result, employment in the construction industry rose 
from 1.2 million in 1996 (9.2% of the labour force) to 2.7 million (13.3% of the la-
bour force) in 2007. Consequently in 2007 there were almost as many people em-
ployed in construction alone (excluding related activities) as there were in the whole 
industrial sector (Salmon 2010). 
It should be emphasized, however, that clearly the Spanish housing boom was 
demand-driven. Despite the strong reaction on the supply’s side, the real estate pric-
es had grown explosively. As a result of increased supply of the two essential pro-
duction factors, housing supply in Spain was able to grow very fast. 
                                                   
 
12 It might seem that counterintuitive that a liberaliz tion led to a price increase. However, let us 
consider the following example: 
There is a small country with 1000 km2 of empty land, 500 km2 constructible and 500 km2 non-
constructible. Constructible land is of higher value because it provides its owner with possibilities of 
making a high profit, for example via developing a block of flats and selling it. Let us, therefore, 
assume a price of km2 of constructible land to be as high as 1000 monetary units, while a km2 of non-
constructible land is worth 200 monetary units. Then the law becomes liberalized and it is possible to 
transfer non-constructible land into constructible via an administrative process. Some people decide to 
buy non-constructible land and apply for a change of its properties. In the first round, 100 km2 is 
transferred. There is now 600 km2 of constructible land and 400 km2 of non-constructible land 
available. The price of the initial 500 km2 of constructible land decreases. The price of the left 400 km2 
of non-constructible land increases. The price of the 100 km2 jumps from 200 units per km2 to slightly 
less than 1000 units per km2. As the two markets (of constructible and non-constructible land) slowly 
become one, the prices of the first type decrease and of the second type increase until they reach a new 
equilibrium. 
13 Their sources of income include taxes on property and property development – Property Tax, Tax on 
Buildings and Building Works, Tax on Increased Urban Land Value. Those together nearly reached 
50% of their adjusted income (reduced by transfers and money markets) in 2005. 
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5. Bust in Spain 
Slowdown on the Spanish real estate market started t the beginning of 2007 and in-
tensified after the burst of the asset bubble in the United States in the summer of the 
same year. Garcia-Herrero and de Lis (2008) mention two important channels of 
contagion from the US to the rest of the world: 
- funding liquidity dry-up and the closure of the wholesale money markets; 
- direct exposure to subprime losses (negligible in the case of Spain, where 
subprime credits were not granted on a large scale and banks had not looked 
for investment opportunities abroad). 
 
As a consequence, in February 2007, the number of new house mortgages 
granted in Spain was down by nearly 4%, in May – by 6%, and in October – by 
12%, compared to the previous year. The pace of decline accelerated in 2008, with a 
29% drop in May 2008 compared to May 2006, and a 42% decline in October 2008 
compared to October 2006. In January 2009, the sum of ortgages granted fell by 
58% from the equivalent number in January 2007 – and then stabilized (Salmon 
2010, Figure 13). 
Figure 13. Number of new urban house mortgages granted, Spain, 2007-2010 
 
Source: Salmon (2010) 
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As a consequence of the liquidity crisis, decrease in l nding, fall in the value 
of the banks’ assets (both real estate and equity holdings), and increased level of bad 
debts, the central bank had to intervene to support banks. 
In Spain cajas (“credit institutions with foundational origins and social objec-
tives” with public representation in their governing bodies; Catalán–Moretti 2006) 
made up a half of the banking system. As the crisis hit, the Bank of Spain had to 
support two of them: it provided Caja de Ahorros de Castilla-La Mancha with tem-
porary liquidity support in early 2009 and took into administration the Córdoba 
based ‘CajaSur’ in mid-2010. On the other hand, the soundest bank in the EU ac-
cording to stress tests organized by the Committee of European Banking Supervisors 
(CEBS, now the European Banking Authority) in July 2010 was the Spanish Banca 
March (CEBS 2010). 
6. Conclusions 
The bubble which appeared on the Spanish real estate m rket in the early 2000s was 
influenced by a number of factors on the demand (demography, immigration, cultur-
al factors, fiscal policy related to housing, credit market structure and regulations), 
supply (land regulations, immigration), and monetary policy side. In further research 
the relative strength of each of the factors should be evaluated in detail. In particular, 
in the light of discussion on macro-prudential tools introduction in developed econ-
omies (in the case of the EU introduced in 2014 by the Capital Requirements Di-
rective IV) it is worth verifying how the dynamic provisioning introduction and re-
form influenced the market. 
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